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Steven A. Waters* and Joni Gaylor**
HIS year's survey of partnership law contains no extraordinary or
startling cases. All in all, it was a relatively moderate year of activity
in the area. For the reader's convenience, the authors grouped the
cases under topical headings corresponding to the most important partner-
ship law aspect of the case. The reader is once again admonished to consult
federal bankruptcy court decisions involving partners and partnerships.'
I. PARTNER/PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP
A number of cases during the survey period dealt with aspects of the legal
relationships between partners and between a partner and the partner's part-
nership. The rules governing those relationships make the law of partner-
ships an interesting challenge.
A. Liability; Mutual Agency
The liability of partners for the debts of the partnership and the ability of
a partner to act under circumstances that bind the other partners and the
partnership are important and unique. The cases in this section address
some of those issues.
1. Hall Dadeland Towers Associates v. Hardeman2
In Hall Dadeland the court held that a limited partnership had sold secur-
ities (limited partnership interests) in violation of Florida's securities regis-
tration requirements.3 Much of the case involved securities brokerage,
agency and related issues and has no partnership law relevance.
Procedurally, the partnership, Hall Dadeland Towers Associates, initiated
the lawsuit against Hardeman to collect on a promissory note given to
purchase the limited partnership interest. Hardeman countersued the plain-
tiff partnership and joined its general partners as third-party defendants, al-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S. B.A., Washington University; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, Houston, Texas.
1. See Waters & Berkley, Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 203,
203 n.1 (1990).
2. 736 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
3. Id. at 1436.
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leging violations of state securities laws.4 As a prerequisite to finding
liability for securities violations under Florida law, a court must first find
that the alleged violator "personally participated" in the transaction.5 After
finding that the partnership satisfied the statutory personal participation pre-
requisite through the sales activities of its agents, who were securities bro-
kers, the court held in favor of Hardeman.6
The court found no personal participation by the individual general part-
ners, but entered judgment against them anyway, citing "black-letter part-
nership law" and judicial economy. 7 This effectively highlights the essence,
from a liability perspective, of being a general partner, as provided in section
15 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA).8
2. Mery v. Universal Savings Association 9
Mery primarily involved a lending transaction and the application of the
now famous D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.10 The case contains an apparently
mistaken analysis of partnership law that requires identification. The rele-
vant non-partnership issues are fairly straightforward. To refinance an ex-
4. Id. at 1424.
5. Id. at 1436.
6. Id.
7. Id. The court's view:
It is thus quite obvious that, as a matter of law, [the third-party defendant gen-
eral partners] will be jointly and severally liable for the debt resulting from the
entry of judgment in this case, notwithstanding the fact that they did not "per-
sonally participate" as required by [Florida law]. It does not seem to this Court
to be in the interest of judicial economy to enter a judgment which renders only(the partnership] liable, knowing that other entities, by application of black-let-
ter partnership law, will by operation of law immediately be jointly and severally
liable upon entry of such a judgment. Thus, it is the Court's opinion that its
equitable powers should be exercised so as to extend liability, jointly and sever-
ally, to [the individual general partners].
Id. While the case is probably consistent with Cissne v. Robertson, discussed infra notes 103-
07, because the two general partners were, in fact, properly-served third-party defendants to
the lawsuit in this case, the quoted language suggests a slightly different orientation from that
of the court in Cissne.
8. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970) [hereinafter TULPA]. The
court correctly began with § 10(a) of TULPA, which provides that a general partner of a
limited partnership has the same liabilities as a general partner in a general partnership, citing
TEXAS UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 15 (rEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon
1970)) [hereinafter TUPA].
9. 737 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
10. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) stands for the proposition that
federal bank examiners are not bound by secret agreements of borrowers that tend to mislead
the examiners. The modern extension of the doctrine, which became very highly-developed in
this era of bank and savings and loan failures (some of the numerous progeny are listed at 737
F. Supp. at 1004), protects the FDIC, and, therefore, the taxpayers from exposure to losses
resulting from numerous types of alleged oral agreements, claims of fraudulent conduct and
other matters not authorized by the highest levels of the institution's management and not
contained in the lending institution's permanent records. Those records allow bank examiners
and deposit insurers to determine relatively quickly the lending institution's financial condi-
tion. D'Oench, Duhme is a very effective tool in the hands of federal regulators and insurers, as
well as successor institutions, in defeating claims of borrowers (as often as not, on summaryjudgment). The issue of the applicability of the doctrine arises in this case, and federal courtjurisdiction lies, because Universal Savings failed three days before the filing of this suit and at
the time of the suit Resolution Trust Corporation held the conservatorship.
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isting loan, the plaintiffs formed a Texas limited partnership with a third
individual, Pinckney1 (one of the defendants in this case), and executed
three separate promissory notes payable to defendant Universal Savings.
Several months later, a joint venture composed of the same individuals exe-
cuted a fourth note, also payable to Universal. Pinckney arranged for the
financing evidenced by the four notes.
Among other claims, plaintiffs Mery and Karam alleged that Pinckney
conspired with Universal to defraud them with respect to the loan transac-
tions. Universal, through the Resolution Trust Corporation, raised in de-
fense the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 12 The court concluded that the
D'Oench, Duhm'e doctrine protected Universal from the plaintiffs' claims. 13
Pinckney's alleged conspiracies with Universal were, by definition, "secret
side agreements" because the plaintiffs were not aware of them. 14 Unfortu-
nately for the plaintiff partners, the court found that the agreements were
made on behalf of the partnership, and thus the plaintiff partners could not
avoid application of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.I s The court's statement
of the state partnership law rule producing this result is very puzzling: "It is
a fundamental principle of agency and partnership law that all partners of a
limited partnership are jointly and severally liable for a partner's wrongful
acts and breaches of trust."'16 The court cites section 15 of the Texas Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act (TULPA)17 in support of this proposition.
That section has nothing to do with the stated principle.' 8 On the other
hand, section 15 of TUPA, the key statutory liability provision of partner-
ship law, provides that partners have joint and several liability for the part-
nership's obligations.19 This is undoubtedly the provision the court had in
mind.20
Almost as surprising as its statement regarding the liability of a limited
partner, the court also stated that "once a Limited Partnership has given
11. A review of partnership filings with the Secretary of State's Office, discussed in detail
infra notes 22, 23, and the Cissne v. Robinson case, discussed infra notes 103-07, suggest that
the correct spelling of the defendant's name is "Pinckney," even though the spelling in this
opinion is "Pickney." The former spelling will be used in this discussion.
12. 737 F. Supp. at 1002.
13. Id. at 1003.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 15 (Vernon 1970).
18. TULPA § 15 deals with priority among the limited partners of a limited partnership.
19. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon 1970).
20. Joint and several liability for the partnership includes the obligations under §§ 13 and
14 of TUPA. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 13, 14 (Vernon 1970). Section 13 is
entitled "Partnership Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act" and § 14 is entitled "Partnership
Bound By Partner's Breach of Trust." TUPA § 15 is certainly applicable to the general part-
ners of a limited partnership, pursuant to TUPA § 6(2), which makes TUPA applicable to
limited partnerships to the extent not inconsistent with TULPA. Id. §§ 6(2), 15. The plain-
tiffs might have argued for the applicability of TUPA § 12, which excepts from the general
rule that a partnership is charged with knowledge of or notice of facts relating to partnership
affairs acquired by any one paitner, "a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the
consent of that partner." Id. § 12. The federal defense supplied by the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine would, however, almost certainly have preempted the state law rule. See supra note 10.
1991]
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actual or apparent authority to the limited partner, a bank cannot be re-
quired to act as 'referee' for the partnership. ' 21 It would be unusual for a
partnership to give authority to a limited partner, rather than a general part-
ner. 22 Further, the facts do not seem to show that this occurred here.23
To conclude that the court missed the mark on these points is not difficult.
Before obtaining and reviewing the Certificate and Agreement of limited
partnership, 24 the authors speculated that perhaps the court was sloppy in
its citations or omitted from the opinion key facts that somehow would have
better supported its statements. Neither appears to be the case. The best
explanation may be that the federal law of D'Oench, Duhme preempts the
state law.25
B. Dissolution: Option of Noncontinuing Partner
Perhaps one of the most important and lesser known rules of partnership
law is the payment option available to a partner who separates from a part-
nership that continues its business after dissolution. This option is the more
important of the two partnership issues discussed in the next case.
In King v. Evans 26 the San Antonio court of appeals examined two part-
nership issues: 1) when is property acquired by one partner in its own name
considered to be partnership property; and 2) after dissolution and for pur-
poses of payment to a retiring partner, how and when is the noncontinuing
former partner's interest in a partnership valued? In King the noncontinuing
partner sued the continuing partner to recover the value of the former's in-
terest in the partnership. The primary asset of the partnership was a 725-
acre tract of land. The jury found in favor of the noncontinuing partner.27
The trial court awarded the former partner one-half of the net cash value of
21. 737 F. Supp. at 1004 (emphasis added).
22. By statute, limited partners do not become liable as general partners unless they take
part in the control of the partnership's business. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(Vernon Supp. 1991). Their traditional role has therefore been very passive. The limited part-
ner's role was passive here, as well, at least by contract, although the court's opinion obviously
suggests the contrary. The Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership of Valley Plaza
Partners, Ltd., filed with the Secretary of State of Texas for the partnership in this case on
March 1, 1985 to satisfy TULPA § 3 (and obtained by the authors from the Secretary of
State), does not support the court's statement. Id. § 3 (Vernon 1970 & Vernon Supp. 1991).
The Certificate shows Pinckney, Karam, Mery and First Universal Service Corp. as the gen-
eral partners, and First Universal Service Corp. as the limited partner. The limited partner-
ship did not file any amendments that would have altered its structure. Section 3.04 of the
Certificate and Agreement expressly disabled the limited partner from taking part in the man-
agement or control of the partnership or from transacting business in its name. From this, it
appears that Pinckney orchestrated execution of the four notes as a general partner. Even so,
his authority to act without the other general partners is not given by the Certificate and
Agreement which, in Article III, requires joint action by all general partners.
23. The only clue from the opinion is the court's statement that Pinckney "was previously
associated with the plaintiffs as a limited partner." 737 F. Supp. at 1001. That statement is
expressly contradicted by the Certificate and Agreement, as described supra note 22.
24. See supra notes 22, 23.
25. See supra note 10 (discussing D'Oench, Duhme doctrine). In many, if not most, situa-
tions where the doctrine is raised, the borrowers simply lose.
26. 791 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
27. Id. at 532.
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the partnership at the date of dissolution, plus pre-judgment and post-judg-
ment interest, attorney's fees and costs. 28
The continuing partner appealed, first challenging the trial court's holding
that the land was a partnership asset.29 The special issues answered affirma-
tively by the jury included the following: 1) the partners agreed to form a
partnership; 2) the partnership agreement was entered into before the con-
tinuing partner received title to the property; and 3) the partners agreed that
the farming partnership would include ownership of the land. 30 In other
words, the jury found, as a matter of fact, that the parties operated as a
partnership and that the land was an asset of their partnership.
The court rejected the continuing partner's argument that property can be
owned by a partnership only if it is purchased with partnership property.31
The court relied in part on TUPA section 8(1), which provides that "All
property originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently ac-
quired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership
property.'" 32 The court also noted with approval prior case law holding that
a deed to land taken in only one partner's name is not conclusive in deter-
mining ownership of the asset.33 Whether the partnership owns property
used in a partnership operation is simply a question of intent.34 Thus, the
court found that the trial court justifiably concluded from the jury's re-
sponses to the special issues that, although legal title rested in the name of
one of the partners, equitable title remained with the partnership, and the
land was correctly considered a partnership asset.3"
The court of appeals then analyzed whether the judgment awarded by the
trial court rested on an accurate valuation of the noncontinuing partner's
interest in the partnership. The court accurately stated that if a partnership
is not wound up after dissolution, but is continued, with or without agree-
ment, then the noncontinuing partner may elect between one of two alterna-
tives.36 First, in the absence of a contrary agreement, 37 the former partner
may force a liquidation, take his share of the proceeds, and thereby share in
the profits and losses after dissolution (that is, during the time between dis-
solution and liquidation).38 Alternatively, the noncontinuing partner may
28. Id.
29. Id. Based on the jury's responses to several special issues, the trial court concluded
that the land was acquired on behalf of the partnership as partnership property.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 533.
32. Id. (quoting TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 8(1) (Vernon 1970)) (emphasis
in original).
33. 791 S.W. 2d at 533 (citing Logan v. Logan, 138 Tex. 40, 48, 156 S.W.2d 507, 512
(1941)); see also TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10 (Vernon 1970).
34. 791 S.W.2d at 533 (citing Logan, 138 Tex. at 48, 156 S.W.2d at 512).
35. 791 S.W.2d at 533 (citing Miller v. Howell, 234 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1950, no writ)).
36. 791 S.W.2d at 535.
37. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 6132b, § 38(1) (Vernon 1970) (granting liquidation
right "unless otherwise agreed.").




permit the business to continue and claim as a creditor the value of the part-
ner's interest in the partnership at dissolution.39 If the noncontinuing part-
ner selects the second alternative, the partner has to further decide between
receiving either interest or profits from the date of dissolution of the value at
dissolution of the partner's interest.4°
The court noted that the purpose of TUPA section 42 is not only to afford
a noncontinuing partner the benefit of asset appreciation that occurred up to
the time of dissolution, but also to protect the partner from post-dissolution
losses.41 Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that be-
cause the business continued after the dissolution of the partnership, without
any settlement of accounts,42 the noncontinuing partner was entitled to re-
ceive the value of his partnership interest at the time of dissolution, plus
either interest or profits accrued after the date of dissolution.43 Because
there were no profits attributable to the business after dissolution, the retir-
ing partner naturally chose to receive interest.
King demonstrates clearly the risk that partners run if they do not know
the law well enough to protect themselves. Being aware of TUPA section 42
might at least encourage some partners to promptly settle accounts. Because
section 42 allows a retiring partner the option of choosing profits if the busi-
ness is successful after dissolution, or settling for value at dissolution, plus
interest, if the business is unsuccessful after dissolution, those partners who
are not well-versed in partnership law may find, to their dismay, that a retir-
ing partner is entitled to more money than they originally anticipated. 44
C. Aggregate of Individuals or an Entity?
Although TUPA represents a clear victory for those who believe that a
partnership should be considered a separate entity rather than an aggregate
of individuals, elements of the aggregate theory remain entrenched in the
law.45
In Lawler v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint Venture" the Dallas court of ap-
peals upheld the trial court's summary judgment that an individual partner
in a partnership or joint venture is an employer of the partnership's or ven-
ture's employees,47 for purposes of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.48
As a result, the court held the partner immune from a personal injury suit
39. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon 1970).
40. Id.
41. 791 S.W.2d at 535 (citing CRANE & BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP 496-97 (1968)).
42. The TUPA § 42 option is available to a retiring partner only if there is not a settle-
ment of accounts. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon 1970).
43. 791 S.W.2d at 535.
44. TEx. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon 1970).
45. See Bromberg, Source and Comments, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 1
(Vernon 1970).
46. 793 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
47. Id. at 34.
48. Act of March 29, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 269, repealed
by Acts of 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(7)-(9), 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Sere. 114
(Vernon) (effective January 1, 1991).
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brought by an employee who previously recovered for the same injury under
Texas workers' compensation laws.49 The court's holding was consistent
with earlier Texas decisions involving the issue of whether a partner was an
employee for purposes of bringing a workers' compensation suit against the
partnership.50 The court believed, however, that the issue of whether the
partner was an "employer" for workers' compensation purposes when the
partner is named a defendant was one of first impression.5 1 In reaching its
decision, the court followed the rule adopted by a majority of other states
that have considered the issue.52
The Texas Workers' Compensation Act limits an employee to an exclusive
remedy against an employer, who subscribes to the Act's coverage, for inju-
ries incurred by the employee in the course of employment.53 In exchange,
and at the expense of forfeiting substantial defenses, the subscribing em-
ployer is protected from having to defend numerous lawsuits brought by its
employees. 54 Thus, because Lawler had already recovered under the work-
ers' compensation statute, the law precluded her from again suing her em-
ployer. The key issue remained as to whether the individual partner was her
employer.
The court acknowledged that, since the adoption of TUPA, Texas has
followed the entity theory of partnerships for most purposes, including pro-
cedural issues,55 but noted that there are also many aggregate features to the
Act.56 In this case, the court essentially applied the aggregate theory to the
employment relationship, and held that in cases involving claims by employ-
ees of a partnership employer, the individual partners or joint venturers are,
as a matter of law, also employers of the partnership's or joint venture's
employees.5 7 The court concluded that this holding was consistent with the
theory and practice of workers' compensation law and with the clear legisla-
tive intent of making a statutory workers' compensation claim an exclusive
remedy.58 This case, by invoking the aggregate theory, represents an excep-
tion to the general rule which views partnerships as separate entities.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
4. Is it a Security?
The sale of a partnership interest can indeed be considered the sale of a
49. 793 S.W.2d at 34.
50. Id. at 31 (citing Powell v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 577 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1979, no writ) (partner not employee for this purpose)).
51. 793 S.W.2d at 31.
52. Id. at 31-32.
53. Act of March 29, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S. ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 269 (repealed
1989).
54. 793 S.W.2d at 31 (citing Paradissis v. Royal Indenm. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.
1974)).
55. See Bromberg, Source and Comments, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 1
(Vernon 1970).
56. 793 S.W.2d at 33-34.




security. As such, those individuals buying and selling partnership interests
need to be familiar with both state and federal securities law.
In L & B Hospital Ventures, Inc. v. Healthcare International, Inc 59 the
Fifth Circuit considered whether, under the facts of the case, a limited part-
ner's interest in a partnership was an investment contract subject to the pro-
tections afforded by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.60 The key issue
was whether the limited partners were dependent on the general partner to
run the partnership because of the general partner's specialized knowledge
or expertise. 61 The court framed the issue by citing with approval from
Judge King's "lengthy and thoughtful" 62 opinion in Williamson v. Tucker:63
"A partnership can be an investment contract only when the partners are so
dependent on a particular manager that they cannot replace him or other-
wise exercise ultimate control." 64
In L & B Hospital Ventures, Inc. the plaintiffs, three psychiatrists and a
medical corporation, sold their limited partnership interests in a psychiatric
institute venture to the general partner of that partnership. After the sale,
the plaintiffs discovered certain previously undisclosed facts upon which
they based their suit for fraud and deception. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, accepting defendants' assertion
that the plaintiffs/limited partners' active participation in the business pre-
cluded a securities law violation because the partnership interest sold and
purchased was not a security.65 The trial court emphasized that the plain-
tiffs' active involvement in the hospital and their contribution to its profit-
ability were crucial to the hospital's success, but overlooked or minimized
the essential role of an operational manager, such as the general partner.66
After thoroughly reviewing the fact witnesses' testimony, the court of ap-
peals determined that the plaintiffs did not have managerial control, even
though they did exercise some professional or clinical control.67 Conse-
quently, the court reversed the summary judgment of the trial court, on the
basis that "efforts made by those other than the [limited partners were] unde-
niably significant ones, [comprised ofJ essential managerial efforts which af-
fected the failure or success of the enterprise."'68 The court concluded that
59. 894 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 901 F.2d. 1110 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 55 (1990).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1983). As the court acknowledged, generally a limited partner's
interest is an investment contract. 894 F.2d at 151 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)).
61. 894 F.2d at 152.
62. Id.
63. 645 F.2d 404, 424.
64. Id.
65. 894 F.2d at 152. As discussed supra note 60, a security will not be found in this




68. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (quoting
with approval Securities Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973))).
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summary judgment relief was improper because a material fact issue existed
on where managerial control resided.69
The issue of whether a partnership interest is a security, the sale of which
is subject to applicable securities laws, may increase in significance in an era
where limited partnership statutes give greater management rights to limited
partners. 70 While the sale of limited partnership interests to traditionally
passive limited partners involves the sale of a security, the same may not be
true when the limited partner actively participates in management of the
partnership or its business.
B. Owners of a Partnership Interest are Not Necessarily Partners
One of the most frequent misconceptions of partnership law is that the
owner of a partnership interest is always a partner. That is often not true, as
the following cases indicate.
1. Griffin v. Box 71
The primary partnership issue in Griffin, which procedurally was an inter-
locutory appeal of a temporary injunction,72 was whether transferees of de-
positary receipts, evidencing ownership of units of limited partnership and
distributed to former shareholders on the conversion of a corporation to a
limited partnership, automatically became substituted limited partners
under the terms of the partnership agreement and under Texas law.
In Griffin the limited partners asserted that all transferees, as well as the
initial unit holders of the depositary receipts, 73 were entitled to become and,
in fact, had been admitted as limited partners in the partnership, based upon
the language of both the partnership agreement and the depositary agree-
ment. Specifically, the depositary agreement provided that: 1) the depositary
receipts were transferable; 2) the transferor gave the transferee the right to
become a substituted limited partner in the partnership, subject to the provi-
sions of the partnership agreement; 3) by accepting a receipt, a transferee
became a party to the depositary agreement and agreed to be bound by its
terms; and 4) as provided in the partnership agreement, a transferee, pending
his admission as a substituted limited partner, had the rights of an assignee
with respect to the partnership units. 74
69. 894 F.2d at 153.
70. Eg., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 3.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991); accord
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b) (1988).
71. 910 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1990).
72. The trial court granted and denied in part both parties' motions for preliminary in-
junctions. The key issue was the identity of the general partner, each party asserting a different
person favorable to it. Id. at 258-59.
73. There was no dispute about the status as limited partners of the initial group. Id. at259.74. Id. at 260 (emphasis added). Perhaps because of the procedural posture of the case,
the court did very little to explain that one who owns a partnership interest is not necessarily a
partner. A non-partner owner of a partnership interest is usually an assignee who, typically,
owns most or all economic rights attributable to the interest, but not voting or other manage-
ment rights. Fg., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 20 (Vernon 1970) (partnership
1991]
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The court concluded that, as a matter of contract, the depositary agree-
ment, which standing alone the court acknowledged could almost be read to
provide for automatic admission,75 was made subject to the partnership
agreement. The partnership agreement gave the general partners the discre-
tion to admit transferees as limited partners. 76 Therefore, no unilateral or
automatic right to become a substituted limited partner existed.
The second issue was whether the general partner owed a fiduciary duty to
a non-partner transferee. The transferees alleged that the general partners
owed them a fiduciary duty and a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which
required them to admit all eligible transferees as substituted limited partners.
The court, however, said that the general partners owed no fiduciary duty to
transferees who were not partners.77 Furthermore, the court found inade-
quate evidence to conclude that the general partners occupied any other spe-
. cial relationship with any particular transferee that gave rise to a fiduciary
duty.78 The court rejected the transferees' claim that the general partners
approved the transferees' admission.79 The court rejected the claim despite
evidence that the general partners represented in proxy statements that the
depositary receipt holders would be entitled to vote and that the transferees
were, in fact, permitted to vote at a partnership meeting without having for-
mally been admitted as substituted limited partners.80 The court acknowl-
edged that the general partner apparently admitted some transferees,
directly or by estoppel, but found insufficient evidence to conclude that the
general partners admitted any particular group, so as to thereby validate the
votes they had cast for "their" general partner candidate.81
2 Friedman v. New Westbury Village Associates82
While the limited facts make it difficult to accurately evaluate the court's
conclusions, a full treatment of the facts as they are given in the opinion is
necessary to discuss this case. Plaintiff, Susanna Friedman, became the
owner of a seven percent joint venture interest in the defendant joint venture,
as part of a divorce settlement with her husband. Her husband was left with
a five and one-half percent interest. The joint venture agreement contained a
capital call provision obligating each venturer to contribute his or her pro
rata share of cash funds necessary to conduct the business of the joint ven-
ture. The agreement expressly included principal and interest due on prom-
interest in limited partnership context); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 24-27
(Vernon 1970) (general partner's interests). Also, see the Friedman discussion, infra notes 82-
96.
75. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 20(d) (Vernon 1970) provides statutory
support for this proposition. An assignee can become a limited partner if the certificate of
limited partnership allows the assignor to, and the assignor does, give the assignee that right.
76. 910 F.2d at 260.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 262-63.
82. 787 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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issory notes executed by the venture in connection with the ownership and
operation of an apartment project. Failure of a venturer to pay his or her
share entitled the other venturers to advance the necessary funds and receive
a lien against the joint venture interest of the defaulting venturer, obligating
the defaulting venturer to repay 125% of the amount advanced, plus inter-
est. Failure to repay within six months after default caused the non-paying
venturer to forfeit his or her interest proportionately to the paying venturers.
The venture agreement further provided for determination of matters of
policy by a vote of seventy percent in interest of the venturers. The agree-
ment obligated each venture partner to personally execute promissory notes
evidencing interim financing. The financing was to be used both for con-
structing improvements and for permanent mortgages, but without personal
liability for the latter. The cp-managers of the venture, Samet and Mr.
Friedman, were expressly prohibited, however, from mortgaging the project
or from borrowing money unless they first obtained a vote of at least 70% in
interest of the venturers.
The divorce agreement between the Friedmans obligated each of them, as
transferee, to assume and pay the debts, encumbrances and liens proportion-
ately to the extent that each received property from the other spouse. Mrs.
Friedman was not, however, responsible for personal guarantees signed by
Mr. Friedman, "except as to [her] pro rata share by reason of her interest in
the properties listed on Schedule I, Item 15, and as contained in the respective
Partnership or Joint Venture Agreements."8 3
Sometime later, Mrs. Friedman, and several of the venturers, signed a
document authorizing the manager of the joint venture to execute a $50,000
promissory note on behalf of the venture. Fifteen months later, a $300,000
note was executed, identifying Ben Friedman as the maker and signed by
Ben Friedman, as trustee. Samet apparently testified that Mr. Friedman
signed the note on behalf of the venture to borrow money to renovate the
venture's project.84 The note stated the collateral to be the "continuing
guarantee of the partners."8 5 Only six weeks later, the lien against the apart-
ment project was foreclosed and the sales proceeds applied to reduce the
balance of the $300,000 note. The venturers received a cash call for contri-
butions needed to pay the balance, and all venturers paid their shares except
for the Friedmans. Approximately a year later, the venture made demand
on the Friedmans to pay to the venture their share of the amounts remaining
due on the $300,000 loan, plus certain other items that apparently had not
been previously paid.86
Mrs. Friedman attempted to avoid liability by asserting three arguments:
1) the divorce settlement agreement was ambiguous on whether she was lia-
83. Id. (emphasis in original); see infra note 90 for a discussion of the quoted language.
84. Id. at 157.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court stated that Mrs. Friedman owed money for prior cash calls, as well as
the cash call on the $300,000 note, but stated two paragraphs later that Mr. Samet testified




ble for debts arising from ownership of property awarded to her; 2) that a
note executed as part of the settlement of the deficiency on the $300,000 note
had not been approved by the requisite owners of 70% of the percentage
interests of the venturers required to approve a matter of policy; and 3) her
interest in the joint venture had been automatically forfeited after she failed
to pay within six months of her default, excusing her from further liability.8 7
In response to Mrs. Friedman's assertion that she was not liable because
she had not signed the joint venture agreement or the $300,000 note, the
court referred to TUPA section 28-B(l)(A), 88 which provides that on the
divorce of a partner the spouse is, to the extent of the spouse's interest in the
venture, regarded as an assignee or purchaser of the interest from the part-
ner.89 That reference seems completely unnecessary given that the written
property settlement agreement clearly awarded her the seven percent ven-
ture interest. The court further found the settlement agreement unambigu-
ous on the issue of her liability for debts incurred on the property awarded to
her, including the seven percent joint venture interest.90 Mrs. Friedman also
argued that she was not liable for the joint venture's debts, presumably based
on a claim that, because she had not signed the joint venture agreement, she
was not a partner.91 In addition to the divorce settlement agreement award-
ing her the partnership interest, to which the court arguably gave too much
significance, the court found ample evidence of partnership by estoppel
under TUPA section 16.92
Based on the facts given in the opinion, it would seem that Mrs. Friedman
had a much stronger argument that the $300,000 note was not within the
scope of the expressly authorized financing and, therefore, required a 70%
affirmative approval. Her apparent failure to push that position, confirmed
by the court,93 suggests that she believed that the debt had in fact been
authorized.
The court had little difficulty in concluding that Mrs. Friedman could not
87. 787 S.W.2d at 158. It is revealing that Mrs. Friedman apparently did not argue that
the $300,000 note had been improperly executed for lack of the requisite seventy percent vote.
88. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 28-B(l)(A) (Vernon 1970).
89. 787 S.W.2d at 158.
90. Id. The issue of ambiguity is debatable if based solely on the language from the settle-
ment agreement quoted in the text supra note 83 and discussed infra note 91. The court did
not refer to TUPA § 17, which effectively provides that a newly-admitted partner is liable for
existing partnership debts only to the extent of the partner's interest in partnership property.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 6132b, § 17 (Vernon 1970). The settlement agreement lan-
guage quoted in the text supra note 83 is similar in import.
91. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 16 (Vernon 1970). There is certainly a
legal difference between an assignee of a partnership interest and a partner. See id. §§ 24-27,
also discussed in Griffin v. Box, supra note 74. Apparently without realizing this distinction,
this court paraphrased TUPA § 28-B(1)(A) and treated the divorced spouse of a partner as an
assignee of the transferred interest. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT ANN. art. 6132b § 28-B(l)(A)
(Vernon 1970); see discussion in the text, supra note 89. Assignees do not have the same
liability as partners; absent agreement, assignees cannot participate in management and are
simply entitled to receive the assigning partner's share of profits. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b, § 27 (Vernon 1970).
92. 787 S.W.2d at 158.
93. Id. at 158-59.
[Vol. 45
PAR TNER SHIPS
benefit from her own default by being thereafter relieved of liability for joint
venture indebtedness.94 Mrs. Friedman urged as support for her position a
case in which the remaining joint venturers sought to enforce a forfeiture
provision;95 the case cited, however, was clearly distinguishable from her
situation. In each case, the court precluded a defaulting partner from bene-
fiting from the default.96
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Accounting Prerequisite to Lawsuit Between Partners
The next case is a reminder, both of the rule (which the authors believe to
be unknown to many practitioners), and the exception to it, which requires
an accounting as a prerequisite to lawsuits between partners.
In Kartalis v. Lakeland Plaza Joint Venture97 the Dallas court of appeals
followed its earlier 1989 holding that there is a recognized exception to the
general rule that one partner may not sue another partner on matters arising
out of partnership business unless an accounting to settle all financial mat-
ters between the partners is first performed. 93 The established exception al-
lows one joint venturer or partner to sue another without first having an
accounting, if the matter is so simple and free from complexity that it can be
readily resolved.99
In this case, the joint venture sued Kartalis to recover his pro rata share of
operational costs and cash calls claimed to be due pursuant to a joint venture
agreement. The joint venture agreement required each venturer to pay ad-
vanced estimated costs when the cash flow of the venture was insufficient to
satisfy those projected costs. The court explained that this case fell within
the "free from complexity" rule because it involved only a few simple trans-
actions, in which the expenses were essentially fixed' 0° Therefore, an ac-
counting was unnecessary.101 Even if an accounting had been necessary in
this case, the financial statements, detailed assessment notices and tax re-
turns, which the joint venture regularly provided to Kartalis, persuaded the
court that the joint venture had effectively provided an accounting.10 2 This
94. The terms of the joint venture agreement could, of course, have provided for relief
from liability.
95. 787 S.W.2d at 159 (citing Shindler v. Harris, 673 S.W.2d 600, 607, 609 (Tex. App.-
Houston (1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
96. 787 S.W.2d at 159.
97. 784 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
98. Id. at 66 (citing Chipley v. Smith, 292 S.W. 209 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, opinion
adopted)). Note that the earlier 1989 case, cited infra note 99, coincidentally also involved
Kartalis and was reported in last year's survey. It is the authors' experience that the general
rule requiring an accounting is not widely known by practitioners and may result in premature
litigation.
99. 784 S.W.2d at 66; see Kartalis v. Commander Warehouse Joint Venture, 773 S.W.2d
393 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ). A joint venture is generally governed by the same
principles of law that apply to partnerships. See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 937 (rex.
1988).





exception to the well-settled partnership principle, that an accounting of all
financial matters of a joint venture is a condition precedent to the mainte-
nance of a lawsuit between joint venturers, may hereafter be known as the
Kartalis Exception.
B. Partners As Necessary Party Defendants
Even though general partners have joint and several liability for their part-
nership's debts, properly and timely naming general partners as defendants
can be procedurally crucial to maintaining that liability.
1. Cissne v. Robertson 10 3
Cissne involved a suit by a real estate broker and salesman' 04 to recover a
real estate commission against three partners. 105 In addition to the numer-
ous procedural complications, including summary judgments, non-suits, a
partner's bankruptcy, and a bench trial granted on motion for new trial,106
the case involved various provisions of the Texas Real Estate License Act.
The main partnership issue in Cissne was the effect on the liability of a
partner of a judgment taken against the partner's partnership. In upholding
the trial court's decision granting judgment in favor of the partner defend-
ants, the court of appeals stated that where a judgment is taken against a
partnership and not against the individual partners, judgment against the
individual partners is not presumed.' 0 7 The service of citation rules of the
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, not cited by the court, also support
this result.10 8 This can be a conceptually difficult area for practitioners who
do not practice regularly in partnership law matters.
2. Cothrum Drilling Company v. Partee 109
In Cothrum the court of appeals held that the trial court had erred in
rendering judgment against individual partners of a partnership not individ-
ually served with citation before the statute of limitations ran on the cause of
action.110 The lower court had entered judgment against the partnership
103. 782 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
104. Although brokers and salesmen perform the same role in a real estate transaction, a
broker must satisfy a higher statutory standard; therefore, a real estate salesman must have a
sponsoring broker. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1991) (Texas Real
Estate License Act).
105. Interestingly, this case also involved Messrs. Mery, Karam and Pinckney, parties in
Mery v. Universal Say. Assoc., discussed in text beginning supra note 9.
106. 782 S.W.2d at 915.
107. Id. at 927 (citing Mallory v. Russell, 242 S.W. 1112, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth
1922, writ dism'd)).
108. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 17.022, entitled "Service on Partnership,"
reads: "Citation served on one member of a partnership authorizes a judgment against the
partnership and the partner actually served." TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 17.022
(Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
109. 790 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
110. Id. at 800. As support the court cited § 17.022 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, quoted supra note 108.
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and, jointly and severally, against the individual partners. I I Although one
could logically argue that a timely filing and serving of the partnership
should toll the statute of limitations as to individual partners, who will, by
law, be jointly and severally liable if liability is found against the partner-
ship, 112 that apparently is not the law in Texas.' 13
IV. FREEDOM To CONTRACT Is NOT ABSOLUTE
The Texas Supreme Court has made it clear that wide latitude is given to
partners in structuring their agreements.' 14 That freedom is not unfettered,
at least as to non-partnership law issues.
Phillips v. Phillips115 involved a suit by a limited partner against the gen-
eral partner for breach of the limited partnership agreement. The subject
partnership agreement contained a provision entitling the limited partner to
recover from the general partner ten times her actual damages under certain
circumstances.116
Procedurally, the court decided the case on motion for rehearing, each
party having filed one. The limited partner argued that the court erred in
not reforming its judgment in her favor to allow the multiplier provided for
in the partnership agreement. As support for the argument, the limited part-
ner cited a case that held that where the parties agreed on ceitain damages,
the court would enforce the agreement unless the defendant pled and proved
that the provision for liquidated damages was in fact a penalty. 17 The court
rejected this rule and cited Stewart v. Basey 118 in support of its holding that,
as a matter of law, the partnership agreement provision called for a pen-
alty.119 The court did not agree that the defendant could waive the penalty
defense by failing to plead it as. an affirmative defense, holding instead that
the provision, on its face and as a matter of law, provided "for a penalty in
the nature of punitive damages, as distinguished from liquidated compensa-
111. 790 S.W.2d at 797 n.2.
112. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon 1970) (general partners
jointly and severally liable for partnership's debts).
113. 790 S.W.2d at 800 (citing Wooster v. Hoecker, 195 S.W. 332, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1917, no writ)).
114. In Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), the court said:
The agreement of the parties is to be controlling of our decision and we shall
construe and interpret their agreement pursuant to the applicable law of con-
tracts. We look to the Texas Uniform Partnership Act for guidance only when
the partnership agreement is silent. In this case we shall often consider it only
as an interpretive aid.
Id. at 672 (citation omitted).
115. 792 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, writ granted).
116. Section 16.2 of the partnership agreement reads as follows: "16.2 Damages. If the
general partner breaches his trust hereunder, he shall pay to the limited partner as liquidated
damages ten times the amount she loses as a result of such breach. Errors of judgment shall
not be considered breaches of trusts." Id. at 272 n.2.
117. Id. at 270 (citing Robinson v. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 633, 637
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
118. 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952).
119. 792 S.W.2d at 272.
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tory damages."'' 20 The court underscored the plead and prove rule of Robin-
son,' 2 1 implying that there the issue was one of fact and here it was a matter
of law. As much as partner relationships in Texas are a matter of contract
between the partners, 22 the "right of competent parties to make their own
bargains is not unlimited."'123
120. Id.
121. Id. at 270 (citing Robinson, 553 S.W.2d at 637).
122. E.g., Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd; see discussion supra note 114.
123. 792 S.W.2d at 270 (quoting Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d at 486 (emphasis in
original)).
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